Daniel Telech (LU) will give a self-contained talk at the Higher Seminar in practical philosophy. Here is his title and abstract:

The Wrongs of Undeserved Praise

What, if anything, is morally wrong about praising agents who have not acted praiseworthily (i.e., agents undeserving of praise)? According to many theorists, the wrongness of blaming non-blameworthy agents is accounted for by the harmful (or sanction-like) nature of blame. Given that blame harms, or sets back the interests of, the blamee, it is thought to be unjust or unfair (in a non-comparative sense) to blame the agent who does not deserve the harm of blame. This approach suggests that if praising the undeserving can be wrong, it will be so for very different reasons. For, praise intuitively promotes the interests of, or benefits, the praisee (if not necessarily, then characteristically). So, while it might be wrong to praise the undeserving instead of the deserving agent—it may be unfair, in a comparative sense—absent further factors, there will presumably be nothing wrong with praising an undeserving agent per se. At least, it will not be the case that one wrongs the undeserving agent in praising her. This, at least, is the standard assumption. This paper challenges the standard assumption in the course of outlining three ways in which it may be wrong to praise the undeserving. First, praise may indeed be comparatively unfair. Second, undeserved praise dilutes (or contributes to the dilution of) the value of praise. Third (and most controversially), undeserved praise—at least given certain assumptions about the praiser’s epistemic state— sets back the praisee’s moral interest in being evaluated in response to one’s actual agential contributions. 

Welcome!

Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen