Higher Seminar in Theoretical Philosophy: Carl-Johan Palmqvist "Don’t Blame the Victims: Why We Should Prefer a Non-doxastic Understanding of Disinformation Over a Vice Epistemological"

Don’t Blame the Victims: Why We Should Prefer a Non-doxastic Understanding of Disinformation Over a Vice Epistemological

In contemporary society, the proliferation of disinformation like fake news and propaganda is an increasing problem. Philosophers working with the issue standardly presuppose that disinformation’s main function is to spreads false beliefs. Many employ the perspective of vice epistemology, which concerns flawed thinking and irresponsible epistemic behaviour. They assume that disinformed subjects have in some important way failed to be rational, critical thinkers, which has led to the formation of false beliefs (Cassam 2016; 2019; Pritchard 2021).

            Arguing that we have strong reasons to reject the vice epistemological perspective, I develop a contrasting, non-doxastic understanding. In my view (for which there is substantial empirical evidence, see for example Erlich & Garner 2023; Meyer et. al. 2021), disinformation does not function by spreading false beliefs, but by introducing epistemic possibilities which contrasts with the subject’s beliefs. It creates an epistemic context of doubt and uncertainty. In such a context, it is not belief but non-doxastic attitudes such as hope, faith, fear or precaution which are proper epistemic responses.

            A non-doxastic perspective allows us to understand the victims of disinformation as rational subjects, doing their best in what Noaves & de Ridder (2021) calls a “polluted” epistemic environment. From this perspective, the vice epistemological insistence on explaining the workings of disinformation by the epistemic misbehaviour of disinformed subjects can only be understood as victim blaming.

I will end by addressing possible measures against disinformation. Vice epistemologists often suggest that disinformed subjects need to foster epistemic virtues like critical thinking (Cassam 2019; Pritchard 2021). However, in epistemic uncertainty, an increase in critical thinking can easily make things worse. A non-doxastic perspective suggests other measures, either preventative to combat the rise and spread of “polluted” epistemic environments, or interventions aimed at guiding subjects out of these harmful contexts.