The department of philosophy is delighted to welcome Lucy McDonald (King's College London https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/lucy-mcdonald), who will act as faculty examinator ("opponent") at Jiwon Kim's final seminar (mock-defence). The tile of Jiwon's thesis is

How to Guide with Words: Moral Advice as a Speech Act

Abstract

Despite the prevalence of moral advice in everyday interactions, its philosophical significance has been underexplored. This thesis develops an account of moral advice as a distinct speech act that guides action by fostering deliberation, shaping how agents navigate moral uncertainty. It asks: How does the speech act of giving moral advice guide action? To answer this, the thesis examines how moral advice functions within moral discourse, particularly its role in shaping moral deliberation.

   It begins by analysing the role of explicit performatives such as “I advise you to φ”, arguing that these expressions do not merely state or declare advice, but prime the hearer for deliberation. Against indirect and declarative accounts of performatives, I propose the Priming View, which explains how explicit moral advice signals the adviser’s commitment and invites the hearer to deliberate on the content of advice.

   The thesis then re-examines the nature of directives. Traditional accounts of directives assume that directives aim for compliance, yet I argue that advising functions differently. I introduce a distinction between speaker-first and hearer-first directives, showing that moral advice, which belongs to the latter, is not about securing compliance but about inviting sound deliberation by appealing to the adviser’s perlocutionary intention. This leads to a challenge to existing speech act accounts that appeal to objective normative standing: while some, especially Terence Cuneo (2014), argue that speech acts depend on a speaker’s objective normative standing (i.e., rights, responsibilities, and obligations), I show that moral advice depends more on the adviser’s perlocutionary intentions.

   Finally, I refine and extend Sbisà’s (2018) tripartite model of speech act norms – constitutive rules, maxims, and objective requirements – to establish success conditions for moral advice. I argue that, unlike non-moral advice where the authority and competence of the adviser may be based on formal expertise, moral advising requires the adviser to be more knowledgeable, experienced, or deemed trustworthy by the advisee. Additionally, I argue that moral advice must include justificatory reasons as a maxim and that sincerity should be elevated from a maxim to a constitutive rule: moral advisers must give advice for morality’s sake and genuinely believe in the value of their guidance.

   By bridging speech act theory and metaethics, this thesis advances our understanding of moral advice as a speech act, reviving mid-20th-century insights while engaging contemporary debates on moral guidance, normative standing, and deliberation.

Notice that this event takes place on a Monday:

Date and time: March 31st, 13.15-15.00.

Venue: LUXB538.

Welcome!

Toni